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ABSTRACT: Relationships between economic growth rates and the
expansion of welfare expenditures in Western nations are examined. The
point is made that real gross national product grew rapidly from about
1959 until about 1973, but that since 1973 it has either grown slowly or not
at all, while welfare expenditures and entitlements have continued to
escalate. Forecasts of a variety of important economic variables in these
countries for the near term are presented and discussed, and it is concluded
that despite the current modest economic improvement, difficulties in
funding welfare states will continue throughout the remainder of the 1980s.
Some consideration is given to problems in welfare states to the end of the
century, and further difficulties in funding and managing these states are
forecast for this period as well. Problems of welfare states are not regarded
as short-term by-products of maladjustments experienced in the Western
world in the last 10 years but rather as long-term characteristics.
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WELFARE states in the Western
world, though some have roots
extending back over 100 years, began to
grow rapidly only after the end of the
post-World War II reconstruction pe-
riod. Accelerations in the growth of
these states took place in a context of
sustained high levels of real economic
growth, particularly between 1959 and
1973. It is often argued that much of the
expansion in state welfare and in the
redistribution of income, which by the
1960s had become an essential feature of
welfare states-indeed their central
purpose in the view of many-came
about largely because of the surpluses
provided by these high rates of real
economic growth.
Since the oil and commodity crises of
1973-74, however, annual real economic
growth rates not only declined sharply,
but became negative by the end of the
1970s in many Western as well as non-
Western nations. With a smaller sur-
plus, or perhaps none at all, yet with
redistribution continuing to grow be-
cause of the momentum created by the
earlier high rates of real economic grow-
th and the continuing expansion of
social legislation and entitlements, mid-
dle- and high-income persons became
much more aware that resources were
being allocated away from them and
began to take actions to offset some of
the effects of this loss. Unemployment
levels also rose, leading to increases in
government spending on income main-
tenance and on measures to reduce
unemployment. Inflation rates mounted
to high levels and afflicted virtually all
Western economies, reducing the real
value of social security funds, further
eroding real incomes of some groups,
and causing problems for the poor as
well. Economists, accustomed to debat-
ing the so-called trade-off between un-
employment and inflation, now looked
with dismay upon economic systems in
which both were rising to high levels. To
put it briefly, we moved in the 1970s
from a world of high expansion with low
inflation to a world with low expansion
and high inflation.
By the early years of the 1980s vir-
tually every country in Western Europe
had significant public sector deficits.
Total government budgets were also in
deficit in the United States, France, the
United Kingdom, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, and others. Even the
strong growth economies of West Ger-
many and Japan were experiencing
budget deficits as well as current ac-
count deficits in their international
trade-West Germany for the first time
since 1953. One began to hear talk of the
&dquo;crisis in the welfare state,&dquo; and al-
though this seems to be an overly color-
ful phrase because no Western nation
has yet begun to dismantle or signifi-
cantly to reduce its welfare state ap-
paratus, rates of increase in welfare
budgets have been moderated in many
countries.
There also appears to be widespread
belief that a more conservative approach
to the welfare state is desirable; that its
limits should be rationally questioned;
that inflation, slow real economic grow-
th, and redistribution have eroded the
real income of some groups to such an
extent that they will no longer support
increases in transfer payment programs
and are now pushing for reductions; and
that there is strong pressure from elec-
torates to avoid further increases in
taxes and possibly to reduce them.
Moreover, austerity budgets have been
adopted in France, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Den-
mark, and still other countries.
These events, contrasting so sharply
with those of 1959-73, have raised many
questions. If we continue to experience
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low real economic growth rates, as
many predict we will, what effects will
they have on the welfare state? Will
economic policy be the principal deter-
minant of social policies in the 1980s? In
any case, what trade-offs will have to be
made in social and economic policy
agendas? Has the welfare state really
begun to encounter limits? More im-
portant, have fundamental economic
and social changes occurred in Western
countries since the early 1970s?
Such questions, concerning which
there is a vast store of heated and varied
opinions, are easy to state but are ex-
traordinarily difficult to analyze and an-
swer. As Professor Peston has said,
The question of whether there has been a
fundamental change in the economy or in
society is deceptively simple. Methodolog-
ically very deep issues are involved. How is a
fundamental change to be defined? How is it
to be recognized? What have to be ex-
plained-stagflation, a lower underlying
growth rate of real output, worsening in-
dustrial relations, the expansion of OPEC
power, a deterioration in international eco-
nomic and financial cooperation-must be
separate from the explanation. One alter-
native is to arrive at the trivial conclusion-
the cause of X is X. A second is nearly as
trivial; several Xs are very different from
their former levels or rates of changes;
therefore, something basic must have oc-
curred.
The most that can be said is that what has
happened is worthy of analysis and the
presentation of new hypotheses which may
be rather speculative in character. But it
must also be added that those who take the
position that nothing has happened are also
in danger of trivializing the subject.’ 1
In this article-hoping to avoid triv-
ializing the subject-I present data on
past trends and developments in some
principal economic indicators and dis-
cuss a variety of their features. This
should provide a better understanding
of some of the forces shaping our pres-
ent situation. Because developments in
social policy in the medium term will-be
influenced, if not dominated, by eco-
nomic forces, I next present forecasts of
some of the more important economic
variables for 1984 and 1985. Against this
background, I identify and discuss a
collection of major problems and par-
adoxes that will influence both social
and economic policy throughout the
1980s, and offer some comments and
conjectures for the still longer term.
TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS, 1960-83
Table 1 shows annual growth rates
for 1960-83 in real-inflation adjust-
ed-gross national product (GNP), or
in real gross domestic product for those
countries using this measure. It is in-
teresting to compare the annual aver-
ages for 1960-73 with those for 1975-81.
The latter, for individual countries and
for groups of countries such as the
European Economic Community (EEC),
are in most cases less than half the
corresponding averages for 1960-73. Al-
though Japan has the highest average
growth for 1975-81, this figure is also
less than half its average for the earlier
period. Similar declines have been ex-
perienced by the 24 Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries-which include
developed as well as less developed
nations. Nor did the Communist coun-
tries escape a similar decline across the
two periods: the USSR average growth
rate also dropped by more than 50
1. Maurice Peston, "New Paths for Socio-
Economic Policy," in The Welfare State in Crisis
(Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 1981), p. 94.
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percent, as did that for the other Eastern
European countries. The data for
1983-a recovery year-appear more
favorable, especially for the United
States; the United States began a re-
covery in 1983 that turned out by mid-
1984 to be the strongest recovery since
1949. The improved rates in 1983 for
other Western countries, however, are
still substantially below their corre-
sponding averages for 1960-73.
The similarities in the decline of av-
erage rates across the two periods are a
striking phenomenon that has received
little attention in published studies of
real economic growth during this pe-
riod. When one considers that the na-
tions shown in Table I differ markedly
from one another in level of GNP, in
economic structure, in political system,
and in cultural background and her-
itage, the similarity in decline appears
all the more remarkable. These declines
in real GNP growth rate coincide with
and probably reflect worldwide declines
in productivity, also a commonly shared
phenomenon, which have been discussed
by many researchers . 
2
-While real economic growth rates
were declining in the 1970s, unemploy-
ment rates were increasing in many
countries, as indicated in Table 2. These
data, incidentally, have been adjusted in
an attempt to make them more com-
parable across countries. Definitions
and calculations of unemployment and
employment vary across countries, and
data are often compiled from national
surveys that are taken at different times
2. One example is J. Kendrick, &dquo;Interna-
tional Comparisons of Recent Productivity
Trends,&dquo; in W. Fellner, ed., Essays in Contem-
porary Problems, Demand, Productivity, and
Population, 1981-82 ed. (Washington, DC: Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search, 1981 ).
TABLE 1
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (Percentage)
SOURCES: Cols. 1 , 2, and 3 from Economic Report of the President, 1983 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1983), tab. B-109, p. 285; cols. 4-8 from Economic Report of the
President, 1984 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), tab. B-107, p. 341.
*Data for 1983 are preliminary estimates.
tFigures for France, the United Kingdom, and Italy are gross domestic product.
*&dquo;EEC&dquo; denotes the European Economic Community, which consists of Belgium, Denmark,
West Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
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of the year using different sample
designs.
All countries shown have experienced
sharp increases in unemployment rates
since 1967 as the demand for labor has
failed to keep pace with increases in the
labor force. There is a strong tendency
for real wages to continue to rise in
Western countries in tandem with
mounting unemployment. This, and the
large indirect taxes associated with the
use of labor in these countries, appear to
have induced business to substitute cap-
ital for labor. Comparing 1968 with
1983, unemployment rose in the United
States from 3.5 percent to 9.5 percent; in
France from 2.6 percent to 8.1 percent;
in the United Kingdom from 3.2 percent
to 13.2 percent; and in the EEC coun-
tries, from 3.0 percent to 10.1 percent.
Japan consistently had the lowest un-
employment rate among those shown,
but its rate for 1983-2.6 percent-is
more than twice that of 1968.
Discussions of problems of unem-
ployment are often stated in terms of the
unemployment rate, but it is also in-
formative to consider the volume or
level of employment in various coun-
tries because a given rise in unemploy-
ment rate obviously has one impact if
total employment is rising and a dif-
ferent impact if total employment is
falling or is rising by only a small
amount.
Table 3 shows total civilian employ-
ment in selected countries. Comparing
data for 1972 and 1981, we see that total
employment declined in Belgium, West
Germany, and the United Kingdom and
grew only by small amounts in Den-
mark, France, and in the 10 EEC coun-
tries. Over the same period, total em-
ployment in the United States grew by
22 percent and in Japan by 8.9 percent.
The United States figure is interesting.
Although U.S. unemployment rates
were high, the population had also been
growing over the period and the U.S.
economy, despite its many problems
since 1973, was able to absorb about 18
million persons into its labor force. This
TAB LE 2
STANDARDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Percentage of Total Labor Force)
SOURCE: OECD Economic Outlook, 35:163 (July 1984).
NOTES: Data are standardized by OECD to try to account for changes in employment and
unemployment definition and calculations across countries. Data for 1967-83 are annual averages.
NR denotes not recorded in source cited.
~’&dquo;1984.1&dquo; denotes data for the first quarter of 1984.
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number is about twice the total amount
of unemployment in the 10 EEC coun-
tries in 1981.
The problem of high unemployment
rates and negative changes or small
increases in total employment has many
features. One is the spreading problem
of youth unemployment in Western na-
tions, especially for young women. This
is exacerbated by a significant increase
in labor force participation rates for
women-that is, not only are more
women entering the labor force than in
the past, but a larger proportion is
seeking entry into the labor force. There
is much evidence that the incidence of
unemployment has come to be relatively
heavy upon young persons and partic-
ularly upon women.’
In any discussion of social and eco-
nomic policy the question of the size of
the government relative to the size of the
entire economy is of considerable im-
portance. Size is related to questions of
limits on the welfare state in the view of
many commentators. Various measure-
ment schemes for determining govern-
ment size are possible and all have flaws.
A standard approach to its calibration is
to express total current outlays of gov-
ernment as a percentage of GNP;
another is to calculate total current
disbursements of government as a per-
centage of GNP. Still another measure,
preferred by some, would be to express
either government outlays or disburse-
ments as a percentage of what in the
TAB LE 3
TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (Thousands)
SOURCE: Statistical Office of the European Communities, Eurostat Review 1972-1981 (Lux-
embourg : Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1981), p. 130.
3. Space limitations prevent further discus-
sion of these and related problems; for further
discussion of unemployment and its age and sex
composition in Western European countries, see
W. A. Spivey, Economic Policies in France 1976-
1981: The Barre Program in a West European
Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan,
Graduate School of Business Administration,
Division of Research, 1982); C. Sorrentino,
"Youth Unemployment: An International Per-
spective," Monthly Labor Review, 104:1-13 (July
1981); Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), Youth Unemploy-
ment : The Causes and Consequences (Paris:
OECD, 1980); idem, The Challenge of Unem-
ployment : A Report to Labor Ministers (Paris:
OECD, 1982); idem, The Unemployment of
Women in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD,
1984).
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United States is called net national
product-GNP less capital consump-
tion allowances or the amount spent to
replace used-up capital goods. Net na-
tional product thus provides an estimate
of the total sales value of goods and
services available for a nation’s con-
sumption and for adding to its stock of
capital equipment. Unfortunately, net
national product data are not as com-
parable across countries as GNP, so we
present data on total outlays of govern-
ment as a percentage of GNP, as are
shown in Table 4.4 4
Sweden had the largest percentage in
1982-67.3 percent; this is also the
largest for any country shown in the
OECD source data. Japan’s percentage
for 1982 is the smallest shown-34.5
percent-but its percentage for 1982 is
nearly twice its 1962 estimate. Most
countries have experienced substantial
increases from 1962 to 1982: the figure
for Sweden and Denmark has more
than doubled; Belgium’s has increased
86 percent; that for the Netherlands, 79
percent; and that for the 10 EEC na-
tions, 50 percent. Although there is no
agreement about what a large percent-
age is, the percentages for individual
West European countries shown appear
to be large, as is the figure for all the 10
EEC countries.
SOME FORECASTS FOR
THE NEAR TERM, 1984-85
The most recent OECD forecasts of
real economic growth, which were pub-
lished in midyear 1984, are given in
Table 5 for selected Western nations.
With the exception of the United States,
Japan, and Canada for 1984, relatively
modest growth rates are forecast for
1984 and for most of the countries
shown in 1985. To put it another way,
only in these three countries is a better-
TAB LE 4
TOTAL CURRENT OUTLAYS OF GOVERNMENT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
SOURCE: OECD Economic Outlook, 35:159 (July 1984).
NOTE: Total current outlays of government consist mainly of total current disbursements of
government plus gross government capital formation.
&dquo;’Gross domestic product is used for France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
4. These and related issues are discussed in
G. W. Nutter, Growth of Government in the West
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1978).
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than-moderate recovery being forecast.
Inflation rates in all the countries shown
in Table 5 have been moderating, but
differentials in inflation rates among
these countries have remained relatively
large, posing continuing difficulties of
adjustment in the international econ-
omy. Thus it appears that the relatively
low rates of real growth experienced
since 1973 will continue at least into the
mid-1980s.
The OECD report also provided fore-
casts of employment and unemploy-
ment for selected countries. Table 6
shows 1982 and 1983 data and forecasts
of annual percentage changes in total
employment for 1984 and 1985. The
European countries shown are expected
to have very small increases in employ-
ment through 1985, and these gloomy
prognostications follow two years of
annual declines in total employment.
Other studies, carried out in various
European countries, have produced sim-
ilar forecasts for real economic growth,
employment, and unemployment. 5
Forecasts of European unemploy-
ment rates are even gloomier. Most
nations are expected to have high un-
employment rates, with Belgium and the
Netherlands having very high predicted
rates: approximately 15 percent or
higher. Because all these countries have
extensive unemployment assistance pro-
grams and related benefits, these fore-
casts, should they turn out to be ac-
curate, suggest that these countries will
experience substantial problems beyond
the middle of the decade. The level of
total unemployment for the OECD Eu-
TAB LE 5
FORECASTS OF ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF REAL GROSS
NATIONAL PRODUCT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (Percentage)
SOURCE: For data in cols. 1 and 2, OECD Economic Outlook, 33: 25, 26 (July 1983); for
cols. 3-5, OECD Economic Outlook, 35:18, 19 (July 1984).
NOTES: Latest year for which data are available is the year 1981, so figures given for 1982-
85 are forecasts. Estimates for 1983 and 1984 are rounded to one decimal place.
&dquo;Gross domestic product is used for France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
5. See, for example, International Monetary
Fund, World Economic Outlook (Washington,
DC: International Monetary Fund, 1983), and for
France, F. Eymard-Duvernay, "Combien d’actifs
d’ici l’an 2000?" Economie et statistique, vol. 115 
(Oct. 1979).
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ropean countries is forecast to be nearly
20 million persons by 1985-a disturb-
ingly large figure. These forecasts, cou-
pled with the expectations of modest
real economic growth for all of the
countries shown, if they are realized,
will pose sustained challenges for both
social and economic policies in the
1980s. They contribute considerable fuel
to the arguments about limiting welfare
state expenditures.
A final point should be made that
may partially lighten the dark skies of
the employment and unemployment
forecasts: predictions from a variety of
sources call for declining inflation in
most Western countries and some mod-
eration in unit labor cost increases in
manufacturing. However, sharp infla-
tion rate differentials between countries
are also forecast for the next two years,
which will have continued adverse ef-
fects upon the international economy.
PROBLEMS IN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES
OF WELFARE STATES
We now turn to a consideration of
major problems facing welfare states in
the 1980s, as well as some of the par-
adoxes generated by attempts to deal
with these problems.
Lagging private investment and
capital accumulation
A slowdown has occurred in private
investment as private savings have be-
come increasingly absorbed by the pub-
lic sector and by investment in housing
and consumer durable goods, the latter
two outlets becoming more attractive as
inflation continued to rise and expecta-
tions of still further increases strength-
ened. The total supply of private sav-
ings, and whether it will increase in the
years ahead, are also critical variables
because, by definition, total savings e-
qual total investment, ex post. Total
savings can also be separated into public
and private savings, and if the former is
negative, as is the case when govern-
ments incur deficits, the flow of total
savings available for private investment
is necessarily diminished.
Governments in the West-as well as
in Japan-are currently incurring def-
icits and it appears that they will do so
for at least several more years. Thus the
savings-investment relationship will re-
main a problem in these countries. The
continued fall in rates of return on
investment during the 1970s has had a
striking influence upon the demand side
of investment in major Western coun-
tries. An OECD study found that re-
TAB LE 6
FORECASTED CHANGES IN TOTAL EMPLOYMENT FOR
SELECTED COUNTRIES (Annual Percentage Changes from Previous Year)
SOURCE: OECD Economic Outlook, 35:41 (July 1984).
&dquo;Figures for 1984 and 1985 are forecasts.
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alized rates of return, estimated using
the ratio of gross operating surplus to
gross capital stock, fell in six coun-
tries-the United States, Japan, West
Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and Canada-from 1974 to 1981 and the
downward trends in these rates in Can-
ada, West Germany, and the United
Kingdom can be traced back at least to
the 1950s.6
Depressed pictures of profits and
rates of return on investment have also
emerged from national studies. In 1982,
nonfinancial corporate profits in the
United States-adjusted for inventory
profits and depreciation-yielded the
lowest rate of return on both gross and
net capital stock in the post-World War
II period; rates of return in Canada fell
to their lowest levels since the 1930s, and
gross profit shares in France dropped to
depths not seen for 20 years . 7
Reviving private investment is seen
by many analysts as a key element in
generating a sustained recovery in the
world economy in the 1980s. Expansion
in industrial countries usually spills over
into the developing countries through
trade of goods and services and private
capital flows, including direct invest-
ment in these countries. As the 1983
OECD Economic Outlook noted: &dquo;while
the recovery probably will not be in-
vestment-led, it needs to be investment-
fed, in the sense that investment needs to
strengthen relatively early, so as to be-
come a vigorous and dynamic com-
ponent of growth over the medium
term. ,8 An increase in private invest-
ment over the present relatively low
levels would require a surge in business
confidence and a marked improvement
in profit expectations, both of which
need the spur of rising sales and favor-
able cost anticipations-in particular,
prospects of favorable real after-tax
interest rates. We also need a social and
political environment that encourages
the risk taking required to energize the
investment process; this environment
must include, obviously, improved prof-
it expectations.
Will sufficient private investment
materialize to assist a recovery in the
world economy? Assessments by stu-
dents of the subject vary from unfavor-
able to at best mildly favorable, but
almost all foresee many problems and
dangers, particularly with respect to
continuing high real interest rates,
strong international price competition,
uncertainty in foreign exchange rates,
and sustained fears of high inflation
rates. Increases in productive invest-
ment will require allocation of resources
toward investment and away from both
private and public consumption. This is
to an important extent a political as well
as an economic problem because the
question naturally arises, Whose con-
sumption is to be foregone? The prob-
6. OECD Economic Outlook, 33:56-57 (July
1983).
7. Assessments of total rates of return are
open to technical objections because a firm’s
marginal expected internal rate of return is the key
element in investment decision making. This is, of
course, influenced in turn by expectations about
the real interest rate, but both these rates are
extremely difficult to calculate for an economy
and one falls back on the more easily determined
total rates. The determination of the real interest
rate at some moment in time&mdash;in contrast to
expectations concerning its future level&mdash;is itself a
complex issue, as is another important decision
variable, the after-tax, real interest rate. However
one may respond to the technical and important
problem of profitability measurement, all studies
known to me have indicated that profitability, on
balance, has worsened in the major economies
since the early 1970s.
8. OECD Economic Outlook, 33:6 (July
1983).
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lem is compounded by the prospects of
continuing public and total budget
deficits.
After sifting through all these issues, I
believe that it is unlikely that private
investment will provide the needed im-
petus to real economic growth in the
world economy; that stop-and-go con-
ditions with respect to growth-or more
precisely, go-and-stop conditions-are
likely to continue in the major nations
with the exception of the United States
and Japan during the remainder of the
1980s; and that pressures on govern-
ment budgets will increase.
Labor markets, employment,
and unemployment
Stagnating investment together with
continuing high levels of real wages, as
we have seen, account for a good deal of
the rise in unemployment in major na-
tions since 1973. Western countries have
tried to lessen the magnitude of these
problems but this has often, and par-
adoxically, contributed to their wor-
sening. An example is provided by the
way governments raise revenues to
spend on unemployment and on related
income maintenance programs. The
revenues are largely derived from taxes
on employers and on those who are
employed rather than from the general
revenue-this is particularly true in
countries in Western Europe. This tends
to raise costs for employers and to
depress demands for goods and services
by workers, both of which have damp-
ening effects on aggregate demand and
upon subsequent employment growth.
Efforts to deal with the youth un-
employment problem have also gener-
ated paradoxes. A program often set
forth by politicians, ostensibly to assist
the young, is that of legal minimum
wages. These have been the subject of
many investigations; and although points
of view differ, many studies have found
that a 10 percent increase in the mini-
mum wage reduces teenage employment
by approximately 1 to 3 percent and that
it also has a negative effect on young
adult employment-persons aged 20-
24-although less than its effect on
teenage employment.
Some governments have become con-
cerned about the effects of high taxes on
employment and about the possible det-
rimental effects of increases in the min-
imum wage and have passed legislation
aimed specifically at remedying each.
France initiated a national employment
pact (pacte nationale pour l’emploi des
jeunes) in 1977, extending it with second
and third pacts in 1978 and 1979. The
principal feature of these arrangements
was to grant employers a partial and
temporary exemption from paying their
required social security contributions.
Other nations have discussed waiving
minimum wages selectively. Little is
known, however, of the extent and
effects of these programs on unemploy-
ment, even though their costs in bud-
getary terms have been considerable.
A program developed in West Ger-
many beginning in 1973 provides an-
other example of a measure motivated
by a desire to ameliorate rising youth
unemployment-but which had a par-
adoxical result. Its principal purpose
was to encourage older workers to leave
the labor force by offering early-retire-
ment inducements. Workers with an
appropriate number of years of em-
ployment could retire at age 63, two
years before the statutory retirement
age, and workers aged 62 or more could
retire with an actuarially reduced pen-
sion determined by various factors. The
entire package was considerably more
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liberal than the early-retirement arrange-
ments introduced in the United States
some years later.
The program was originally expected
to have little influence on the decisions
of older workers, although if this be so,
one wonders why it was regarded as
likely to help young persons. In any
case, the predictions related to the pro-
gram turned out to be incorrect and the
program has been much more costly
than anticipated. It is regarded as an
important component in the subsequent
deficits in the German old-age pension
fund. The large number of persons
taking advantage of the plan contributed
substantially to the rapid growth in the
number of pension recipients between
1974 and 1977, and the program has
turned out to be a costly attempt to deal
with the problem of youth unemploy-
ment.9
The magnitude of the unemployment
problem (see Tables 2 and 3), its polit-
ical and institutional sensitivity and par-
adoxes, and the prospects for prolonged
sluggish economic growth suggest that
major nations will continue to struggle
with unemployment issues and, unless
private investment improves, will en-
counter only limited success in the re-
mainder of the decade.
Problems in the international
economy
A commonplace observation holds
that interdependence has grown enor-
mously in the world economy. A stan-
dard measurement of a country’s de-
pendence in the international economy
is the ratio of its merchandise imports or
exports to its GNP. However, ratios of
imports or exports to the production of
goods are more informative figures be-
cause GNP includes expenditures on
services-sizable in the West-most of
which are not involved in international
transactions, whereas services are ex-
cluded from the production of goods.
Both sets of ratios for exports are shown
in Table 7.
Although exports were about 7.8
percent of GNP in the United States in
1981, exports expressed as a percentage
of U.S. production of goods amounted
to 26.6 percent. Some writers have sug-
gested that figures like the latter, in-
dicating a much larger involvement in
international trade than is usually ac-
knowledged for the United States, go a
good way toward explaining move-
ments in our economy over the last five
years. These writers also assert that
some of our difficulties, particularly in
manufacturing, are attributable to the
extensive domestic impacts of interna-
tional developments. The ratios of ex-
ports to total production of goods in the
other countries shown also provide food
for thought. With the exception of Ja-
pan, these are over 60 percent and
suggest how sensitive economic policy
in these countries must be to outside
influences. In particular, domestic fiscal
and monetary policies have to be con-
ducted with an awareness of these is-
sues. More will be said on this later.
We have also learned, however, par-
ticularly since 1979, that interdepen-
dence works in a variety of directions. It
can spread prosperity when the major
economies of the world are expanding,
but it can spread recession when these
economies are contracting.’° It has also
been pointed out that solutions to prob-9. See Christine Cumming, "Social Security
in Germany and the United Kingdom," Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, pp.
19-20 (Spring 1983).
10. L. B. Krause, "Perspectives, the Crisis in
the World Economy," Brookings Review, p. 4
(Spring 1983).
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lems of developing countries and par-
ticularly to problems posed by their
external debts depend on sustained
growth in the world economy over the
coming years. One author estimates that
exports of the developing countries
could rise by 20 to 30 percent per year
should this occur, whereas further stag-
flation in the world economy could
result in a decline of up to 10 percent in
their exports and an international debt
position of crisis proportions for devel-
oped and underdeveloped nations a-
like.&dquo; We again see the importance of
healthy rates of real economic growth in
the major nations and the dangers posed
by the modest growth rates predicted
earlier.
Despite the growing interdependence
of nations, however, international co-
operation has broken down, protection-
ism is again on the rise, and inter-
national policy harmonization has
steadily become more difficult to pur-
sue, much less to achieve. Nations have
struggled to find a good mix among
monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange
rate policies but have not been success-
ful. The pressures of the 1970s led many
nations-notably the United States and
the United Kingdom-to try to disin-
flate their economies through monetary
policies in the 1980s, but political prob-
lems and pressure-group action led to
fiscal policies that were not harmonious
with this goal. Western nations have, by
and large, tended to overuse monetary
policies because monetary authorities
can exert more influence over monetary
policies than politicians can-or will-
over fiscal policies. Thus it is not un-
common to see tight monetary policies
and loose fiscal policies when a mix of a
somewhat looser monetary policy and a
TABLE 7
RATIOS OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS TO GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT AND PRODUCTION OF GOODS
SOURCE: International Economic Indicators, p. 36 (June 1984).
11. Ibid., p. 5.
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tighter fiscal policy, at least in theory,
would maintain aggregate demand and
possibly produce lower interest rates.
Western nations are troubled also by
structural deficits in their total bud-
gets.’2 Moreover, structural deficits ap-
pear likely to grow as future spending
increases are expected to exceed future
rises in tax revenues-spending legisla-
tion is almost always more popular with
voters than tax increases.
Countries have also struggled to sta-
bilize or to stimulate their domestic
economies with policies that have had
adverse effects upon their balance of
payments and foreign exchange posi-
tions. A good example is that of France,
which tried domestic stimulation at a
time (1981-83) when other nations were
either disinflating or avoiding stimula-
tive policies. Among the results are two
devaluations of the franc in as many
years, continued high inflation and in-
terest rates and unemployment, and a
decline of about 30 percent-before
correcting for inflation-in France’s
foreign exchange reserves. By 1983 the
government found it necessary to bor-
row money from other European na-
tions in order to maintain membership
in the European Monetary System; and
in 1984 the government had to an-
nounce an austerity program, which
constituted a major shift away from
goals it had set in 1981.
It appears likely that problems of
mixing monetary, fiscal, and foreign
exchange policies will continue to trou-
ble Western nations, that fiscal policy
will continue to be dominated by do-
mestic political considerations, and that
a lion’s share of the operational policy
burdens will continue to be borne by
monetary policy.
Unfavorable demographics and the
imbalance between social program
benefits and contributions
Many writers have discussed various
unfavorable aspects of population devel-
opments in Western nations, chiefly the
aging of populations and an unsatisfacto-
ry distribution of persons in the labor
force and those dependent on the social
security system. In France in 1980, for
example, it was estimated that persons
who were economically active-about
40 percent of the population-contrib-
uted to the support of the remaining 60
percent, who were inactive. Another
measure of aging is provided by the ratio
of workers to nonworkers over 65 years
of age; because nonworkers appear in
the denominator of this ratio, a smaller
ratio usually indicates a larger number
of nonworkers over 65. Table 8 gives
data for selected years for three coun-
tries as well as forecasts for the year
1990.
The imbalance between social pro-
gram benefits and contributions has
been assessed in a variety of ways, many
of which employ differing assumptions
and thus produce differing results. At
least three recent studies have ques-
tioned the standard portrayal of social
security financing and the conventional
actuarial estimation procedures used in
them. They have asserted that a fun-
damental problem currently exists and
will continue to exist for many years to
come because retirees can expect to
receive benefits far in excess of lifetime
contributions plus interest.’3
12. Structural deficits are the amount by
which revenues would trail outlays even at levels
of relatively low unemployment and are con-
trasted with cyclical deficits, which are caused by
transitory influences such as recession conditions
that tend to disappear as recoveries take hold.
13. J. R. Capra, P. D. Skaperdas, and R. M.
Kubarych, "Social Security: An Analysis of Its
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One way to assess this problem is to
develop estimates for a hypothetical but
representative individual over a long
time period and to make comparisons
across various countries. In the study by
Cumming, which updates data and re-
sults of the study by Capra, Skaperdas,
and Kubarych, the individual is taken to
be a 65-year-old, single male with av-
erage lifetime earnings. A ratio of the
discounted present value of expected
benefits to lifetime employer-employee
contributions-plus interest-is esti-
mated for the United States, Great Bri-
tain, and West Germany. The results are
shown in Figure 1.
When the ratio is equal to 1.0, the
discounted present value of benefits
equals accumulated contributions plus
interest; when the ratio exceeds 1.0, the
discounted present value exceeds ac-
cumulated benefits; and when the ratio
is less than 1.0, the opposite is the case.
A reference line corresponding to 1.0-
the dashed line-is indicated in Figure
1. Using this measure, which is only one
approximation of a complex relation-
ship that is difficult to assess, one can
make a rough inference-by interpo-
lating between appropriate data points-
that the present discounted value of
benefits will exceed the lifetime contri-
butions plus interest in West Germany
until about 1998, in Great Britain until
about 2011, and in the United States
until about 2015.
The authors of the studies done in the
United States use these and other anal-
yes to conclude that social security
funding in the countries examined faces
not only a short-run crisis, as many
policymakers have been assuming dur-
ing the last 10 years, but more important
a long-run problem that will persist into
the next century.
SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In the light of the problems and
paradoxes we have considered, what is
likely to occur in the remainder of the
decade with respect to major economic
forces and what will be the impact of
these on the welfare state? Drawing
together the various findings and fore-
casts presented earlier to form what can
only be called my surmises, I believe that
most West European nations will expe-
rience at best a modest economic re-
TABLE 8
RATIO OF WORKERS TO NONWORKERS OVER AGE 65, 1950-90
SOURCE: Christine Cumming, &dquo;Social Security in Germany and the United Kingdom,&dquo; Federal
Reserve Bank ofNew York Quarterly Review, p. 17 (Spring 1983).
Problems," Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Quarterly Review, pp. 1-17 (Autumn 1982);
Cumming, "Social Security in Germany"; and
Klaus-Peter Koppelmann, "Intertemporal Income
Distribution in the Statutory Pension Insurance
of West Germany," in Studies in Applied Eco-
nomics and Statistics (Goettingen: van den Hoech
and Ruprecht, 1979), 8:127-39.
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FIGURE 1
RATIO OF DISCOUNTED PRESENT VALUE OF BENEFITS TO LIFETIME
___ 
CONTRIBUTIONS PLUS INTEREST
SOURCE: Telephone interview with Christine Cumming of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 20 Aug. 1984.
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covery for the remainder of the decade.
The United States and Japan-and pos-
sibly Canada-are likely to do better
than this. Beyond the 1980s, we can
expect persistent high levels of unem-
ployment and low rates of growth of
total employment in West European
countries; these countries appear un-
likely to generate, either economically
or politically, adequate incentives for
significant growth in private investment,
so economic growth rates will not rise to
the levels associated with the expansion
of the welfare state in the period 1959-
73. Moreover, the relatively high unem-
ployment levels and the aging of the
population will continue to exert pres-
sures on the financing of social security
programs so that, coupled with low real
economic growth rates, a crisis atmo-
sphere in the funding of social programs
will continue well into the final decade
of this century and possibly beyond.
Against this background one can
expect to encounter more discussion of
the limits of the welfare state, continued
or increasing austerity in government
budgets, continued agonizing over the
interface between economic and social
policy, and a world in which economic
factors have far more influence over
social policy than in the period 1959-73.
This will lead to still more difficult
challenges for policymakers and to yet
more illustrations of the truth of Max
Weber’s statement that effective policy
requires &dquo;a strong, slow drilling through




and outright resistance to unpopular
economic and social policies will prob-
ably continue to grow beyond their
already substantial levels, and assump-
tions of the passive reactions of individ-
uals will have to be modified in our
theories as well as in their application if
they are to help us deal more effectively
with the world in which we live.
14. Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf" (Oct.
1919) in Gesammelte politische Schriften, 3rd rev.
enlarged ed., ed. Johannes Wineklemann (T&uuml;bin-
gen : J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Sieback], 1971), p. 560.
